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CIVIL RIGHTS

Conviction Nixed, But No Wrongful Imprisonment Suit for Poz Man

Iowa Supreme Court says original guilty plea bars Nick Rhoades’ damages claim
BY ARTHUR S. LEONARD
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SEROPROJECT.ORG

n an unfortunate turnabout, the Iowa
Supreme Court unanimously ruled
on April 15 that Nick Rhoades, whose
guilty-plea conviction to one count of
criminal transmission of HIV was reversed by
that court two years ago, could not bring an
action for damages against the state under its
Wrongful Imprisonment Statute. That law, the
high court argued, does not allow claims by
those who pled guilty.
The Iowa court declined to follow rulings in
some other states interpreting similar statutes
that have allowed such lawsuits when a guilty
plea was vacated on appeal.
Rhoades met a man identified in court proceedings as A.P. — but widely reported elsewhere as Adam Plendl — through a social
networking website. After exchanging messages, Plendl invited Rhoades to his home
and they had unprotected oral sex but anal
sex with a condom. Plendl believed Rhoades
to be HIV-negative based on his online profile, but they did not discuss the issue before
having sex.
When Plendl subsequently learned that
Rhoades was HIV-positive, he contacted law
enforcement and Rhoades was charged with
criminal transmission of HIV under an Iowa
statute subsequently repealed in part due to
the publicity surrounding this case. A new law
was enacted that better reflects the current
science on HIV transmission.
Rhoades pled guilty to the charge and was
sentenced to 25 years in prison, lifetime
parole, and a requirement to register as a
sex offender. No evidence was presented that
Plendl was infected with HIV, and the statute
at that time did not require evidence of actual transmission, merely exposure that could
cause transmission.
Rhoades filed a motion to reconsider the
sentence, stressing the lack of transmission,
and the district court suspended the prison
sentence and placed him on five years’ probation. In an application for post-conviction
relief, Rhoades claimed his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by letting him
plead guilty when there was, in his view, no
factual basis for the charge.
Rhoades argued that because his viral load
was virtually undetectable at the time he had
sex with Plendl, the chance that he would
transmit the virus, even through unprotected
anal sex — which was not alleged — was slight,
and certainly not sufficient to meet the standard of guilt under the statute, which required
“the intentional exposure of the body of one

person to a bodily fluid of another person in a
manner that could result in the transmission
of the human immunodeficiency virus.”
This was described in the statute as “intimate contact.” At the time of his guilty plea,
the trial judge asked Rhoades if he had
engaged in “intimate contact” with Plendl,
without any explanation by the judge or
Rhoades’ trial counsel of the meaning of that
term. Rhoades could well have believed he had
violated the statute without having engaged in
anal sex.

Nick Rhoades addresses the Presidential Council on HIV/ AIDS in
2012.

Although the trial and intermediate appellate
courts rejected his motion, the Iowa Supreme
Court in 2014 reversed because, as Justice
Brent R. Appel writes in the current decision,
“We concluded that the district court had used
technical terms from the statute but that such
conclusory terms were insufficient to establish
that the defendant acknowledged facts consistent with the completion of the crime. We further noted the minutes of testimony and the
pre-sentence investigation report did not provide a factual basis for the element of intimate
contact.”
The Supreme Court had also concluded that
“in light of advances in medicine” the record
contained “insufficient evidence to show that
Rhoades exchanged bodily fluids with A.P. or
intentionally exposed A.P. to the disease.”
By vacating the guilty plea, the court was
not concluding that Rhoades was innocent,
but rather that a new trial was needed to
determine his guilt, either through a properly
informed guilty plea or a trial.
The state chose not to pursue another trial
but instead dropped the charges.
Rhoades is now asserting a claim under
Iowa law for “wrongful imprisonment.” That
provision provides relief if two tests are met:
“the individual did not plead guilty to the pub-

lic offense charged, or to any lesser included
offense, but was convicted by the court or by
a jury of an offense classified as an aggravated misdemeanor or felony,” and the claimant
proves “by a clear and convincing preponderance of the evidence that the claimant is actually innocent.”
The legislature, in this way, was preventing
damage claims by somebody who was convicted but then got off on a technicality. The
Supreme Court pointed out that Rhoades
would have to prove his innocence under the
law that has since been repealed in order to
win relief.
The focus of the case, however, was on the
interpretation of the guilty plea language.
Rhoades argued, with support from cases
outside of Iowa, that a guilty plea vacated or
nullified as the result of an appellate ruling
should not stand in the way of a “wrongful
imprisonment” claim. The Iowa court did not
accept this argument.
First, it pointed out, the statutory language
was clear and did not include any statement,
as was found in other states’ laws, softening
the guilty plea bar in certain circumstances.
Appel noted that the legislature has specifically
provided, in another statute, an out for those
who have pled guilty but are later exonerated
by DNA evidence, showing that if it “intended
to provide relief to those who plead guilty, it
knows how to do it.”
The court also observed that in a case
resolved by a guilty plea, the lack of a trial
record means there is no contemporaneous basis on which to determine whether the
claimant can prove actual innocence.
Even as the court acknowledged the case
against Rhoades seeking compensation lacked
airtight logic, it retreated to a narrow view of its
role in statutory interpretation.
“Although there are substantial arguments
that a guilty plea should not disqualify a claimant from seeking compensation for wrongful
imprisonment in all instances,” Appel wrote,
“we conclude … that the legislature made a different judgment in 1997” when it enacted the
statute. “Our job is to do the best we can in
interpreting the meaning of legislation. We do
not expand the scope of legislation based upon
policy preferences.”
The resulting conclusion, Appel wrote, is a
“narrow but not impractical or absurd result.
Rhoades is represented in this appeal by
attorney Dan Johnston of Des Moines. Since
the case revolves entirely around an inter pretation of an Iowa statute, there appears
no basis to seek further review from the US
Supreme Court.
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